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STRATOSENSE CAP · ESTABLISHED

Aircraft-side controlled
airspace protection

CAP sits between the RC receiver and the flight controller. It holds a local airspace map, knows where it is from its own GNSS and IMU, checks position against zone and authorization, and protects the RC path when a protection condition is met.

Established

It knows where it is
on its own.

CAP does not depend on the aircraft telling it the truth. Independent GNSS gives it position, an independent IMU gives it motion and orientation, and a local airspace map lets it evaluate position against zone without needing a live connection at that moment.

When connectivity is available it synchronises with the cloud and reports over cellular. When it is not, the local evaluation still runs.

StratoSense CAP

PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE

In the RC path,
not in the flight path.

CAP is wired between the RC receiver and the flight controller. Under normal authorized conditions it passes the RC path straight through.

StratoSense CAP / RC path

Cellular reporting · cloud synchronization where connectivity is available REMOTE CONTROL RC RECEIVER STRATOSENSE CAP GNSS · IMU · local map FLIGHT CONTROLLER existing failsafe / RTL

Flight controller: normal RC input

Simulated demonstration

CAP does not fly or steer the aircraft. It has no autopilot function and issues no guidance commands.

When CAP interrupts the RC path under a protection condition, the flight controller interprets the condition as normal RC loss, and the aircraft's own existing failsafe or return-to-launch behaviour takes over. The behaviour that follows is the one already configured on that aircraft.

CAP includes physical pass-through fail-safe behaviour, so the RC path is not dependent on CAP remaining powered and healthy to function.

PROTECTION SCENARIO

Watch the boundary.

The aircraft approaches a protected volume. CAP checks its own position against its local airspace map, interrupts the RC path on the boundary, and the flight controller does the rest — with its own failsafe, not with any command from CAP.

CAP / protection scenario

Simulated feed
Authorized volume Protected volume
Remote control RC receiver CAP GNSS · IMU · local map Flight controller its own failsafe / RTL
—
CAP does not fly or steer the aircraft

CAP AND NPNT

Validate first.
Then release the arm path.

CAP validates the permission it holds for this flight against its own position and local airspace map. The arm path is released only once those conditions are satisfied — and interrupted again if they stop being true.

NPNT / no permission, no takeoff

Simulated feed
Permission applicable authorized pathway Signed artifact bound to flight, aircraft, area, window Device verify on the aircraft or control layer Valid arm enabled Invalid arm blocked
—
NPNT is an aircraft / system-level enforcement concept

What is on board

01

Independent GNSS

Its own positioning, not derived from the aircraft.

02

Independent IMU

Its own motion and orientation awareness.

03

Local airspace map

Zone geometry held on the device, so evaluation does not require a live link.

04

Cloud synchronization

The local map and authorization state update when connectivity is available.

05

Local boundary evaluation

Position checked against zone on the device itself.

06

Flight-specific authorization

Validation bound to the intended flight, checked during operation.

07

Cellular reporting

Aircraft-side reporting independent of the controller link.

08

Pass-through fail-safe

The RC path is physically protected against CAP itself failing.

Protection that respects
the aircraft you already fly.

CAP works with the failsafe behaviour your flight controller already has, rather than replacing it.

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